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THE SHADOW OF NATURAL RIGHTS, OR A 
GUIDE FROM THE PERPLEXED 
Hadley Arkes* 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. By Walter Murphy, 
James Fleming and William Harris, IL Mineola: Foundation Press. 
1986. Pp. 1212. $34.95. 
G.K. Chesterton once remarked that the problem with the world 
was not that it was unreasonable or even reasonable, but that "it is 
nearly reasonable, but not quite." He imagined a "mathematical crea-
ture from the moon" assaying the human body and being struck by its 
symmetry: a hand on the left side, matched by another on the right, 
with the same number of fingers; twin eyes, twin nostrils, twin lobes of 
the brain. "At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found 
a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the 
other. And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be 
wrong." But this is precisely where Chesterton also found the charm 
of life. This "silent swerving from accuracy by an inch" was the "un-
canny element in everything . . . a sort of secret treason in the 
universe." 1 
That same sense of the matter may finally enfold the book of cases 
that has been assembled, shaped, layered- and written- by Walter 
Murphy, James Fleming, and William Harris, II. Any casebook of-
fers, boldly, its scheme of organization, with a grosser, and then a 
finer, table of contents, with the headings, and then the parts, outlined 
in strenuous detail. But beyond that front, we know that there is an-
other design at work: Some animating purpose will account for why 
the cases have been grouped, or "regrouped," in the way they have. 
And yet, we know that the design will show itself most tellingly in 
what it does not contain - in the cases that have been omitted, the 
themes that have been repressed or deleted, the comparisons that have 
not been invited. 
There is, in casebooks, this sudden "swerving from ac~uracy by an 
inch." The authors, or compilers, evidently have a purpose, but they 
cannot convey it directly; they cannot offer here their own treatise, or 
their own extended response to the puzzles they are unearthing. They 
will be compelled to teach through indirection. They will try to guide 
• Edward Ney Professor of Jurisprudence, Amherst College. B.A. 1962, University of Illi· 
nois; Ph.D 1967, University of Chicago. 
1. G.K. CHESTERON, ORTHODOXY 146-47 (1926 ed.). 
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the reader through the thicket of jurisprudence; they will choose the 
path of his movement, and they will determine what he sees. But if 
one wishes to write or teach about the law, the casebook offers an 
awkward, cumbersome instrument. When the compilers of this book 
have the occasion to write, they seek to write well, to write vividly and 
differently, in a tome that curiously makes that effort seem implausible 
or even out of place. 
And so, for example, before the writers even enter their first ques-
tion of "What is the Constitution?" they show the best reflexes of a 
teacher: They begin with a set of cases that can impress the students, 
instantly, with the gravity and the grandeur of the subject. They begin 
with Korematsu v. United States, 2 Hirabayashi v. United States, 3 and 
the cases arising from the evacuation of the Japanese from the West 
Coast at the beginning of the Second World War. They defer, to a 
later point in the book, the more intricate questions of jurisprudence. 
But they take the occasion to record the private exchanges among the 
judges, and the agonies of the judges reveal the reach of the public 
issues. The tension among the judges may be deepened by their per-
sonal abrasions, but those personal aversions cannot obscure the 
strains suffered by the judges over the ends of the law. There was an 
evident sympathy for the Japanese, who were made the objects of 
sweeping restrictions, administered with a racial animus and a war-
time sense of vengeance. On the other side, of course, were the exigen-
cies of war. And even if these measures could not survive a more 
stringent test of justice, were the judges really in a position to vindicate 
these wrongs? Were the judges in a position to supersede the orders of 
the military, or the Commander-in-Chief? Were the courts really the 
institution that could properly take responsibility for the security of 
the country and the deployment of the armed forces? In this prelude, 
set forth before they begin the real "business" of this book, the writers 
are able to impart a sense of the restraints emanating from the charac-
ter of the Court as an institution. They convey something of the char-
acter of the justices, but the descent into gossip is overborne by the 
dominant theme: Whatever personal aversions may feed the tensions 
of the Court, the main agony of the Court is the strain of working 
through the "justification" for a solemn judgment of the law. 
Some of the most fetching writing in the book occurs, as I say, in 
these opening pages, and there is never an occasion when good writing 
is out of place. And yet, when the reader encounters these rich, ab-
sorbing passages, he finds himself holding the remaining 1,100 pages 
of the book in his right hand, and he knows that the remainder is not 
going to be War and Peace. And when he learns, even before the book 
begins its teaching, that Justice Jackson "detested" Justice Black, he 
2. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
3. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
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may properly wonder what difference that could make to the "justifi-
cation" that the Court had to produce in any case. What difference 
could it really make to the project of jurisprudence that it must be the 
mission of this book to explain? Henry James described, in one of his 
stories, a procession on a Sunday in Rome, at St. Peter's. "The bright 
immensity of the place," he wrote, "protected conversation and even 
gossip. It struck one not as a particular temple, but as formed by the 
very walls of the faith that has no small pruderies to enforce."4 The 
"walls" of this book, I take it, are nothing less than the walls of juris-
prudence itself. To take the trouble to remark on the personal animos-
ities among the justices - to raise the matter to a subject, not merely 
worth remarking upon, but a subject that is somehow central to the 
understanding of the Court - seems to incorporate "small pruderies" 
in the foundations of this work. For that reason, it may introduce a 
grave confusion, at the beginning, about the way in which the writers 
understand their own project. Or, it may serve to throw the reader, 
again, off the path of surety. That is what I mean when I say that this 
casebook may be "swerving from accuracy by an inch": Just when we 
think we understand the design of the work, just when we think we 
know what the writers are up to, they throw us off course. That may 
be the charm of the work. That may also be a reflection of the endur-
ing, serious questions that the authors have preferred to avoid. Still, 
when we collect all these strands - when we take account of the 
places where the writers seem at odds with themselves, when they lead 
us to expect one thing and deliver another - when we account, in 
short, for the flaws that would show up in any work of this kind, it is 
still apt to consider just what charms, and what lessons, the book man-
ages to deliver. To see what comes, emphatically, through these pages 
is to recognize at the same time the lessons that are being held back, 
and the issues that the writers seem reluctant to address in a searching 
way. 
* * * 
Any professor who receives a new casebook knows that the princi-
pal cases will remain the same. For a new book to justify itself, or 
commend itself for adoption, it must indeed promise something differ-
ent: there will be a different frame placed around the cases, and there 
will likely be a rearrangement of the cases. The intellectual enterprise 
moves, in part, by recognizing connections among things that have 
previously been unconnected. By grouping cases in a novel way, the 
assemblers may bring out connections that have previously gone un-
perceived. At the same time, they may mute other themes. They may 
choose to leave certain themes unsounded because they are already so 
prominent that they need no further notice. On the other hand, cer-
tain themes may be muted or concealed because the writers do not 
4. James, The Solution, in THE COMPLETE TALES OF HENRY JAMES 365 (L. Edel ed. 1963). 
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wish to make them any part of their teaching. Like the governess in 
The Importance of Being Earnest, they may prefer to omit the chapter 
on "The Fall of the Rupee" as somewhat too sensational for a young 
girl5 or too unsettling, politically, for an impressionable young man. 
But the authors may also be content to leave the reader with the im-
pression that what has been omitted is far less important than what 
has been picked out for mention in the text. 
With these decisions on inclusion or omission, there are of course 
endless quibbles. Nevertheless, any new casebook finds its justification 
in the claim to this kind of novelty. It must be legitimate then to raise 
questions about the groupings of cases that were made or foregone, 
and the omissions that must seem curious. But apart from the ar-
rangement of cases, there is, as I have said, the "frame" that the writ-
ers put around the cases. Writers will often present short, interpretive 
essays at the head of different sections in an effort to guide the reader. 
Murphy, Fleming, and Harris show a willingness to exert themselves 
even more fully in this enterprise, and they take it, as part of their 
assignment, to introduce the student to that maze of concepts that 
have made an impression recently on the juridical mind in America. 
Not all of these concepts have been especially plausible, and it may be 
a task of supererogation for the writers to flex their talents in this way 
- to foster the illusion, among new readers, that these terms are, by 
and large, intelligible. The reader new to the law will suddenly be 
introduced to a world filled with partisans of "interpretivism" and 
"non-intepretivism"; of "positivism," "structuralism," and "depart-
mentalism"; of "strict scrutiny" and "intermediate scrutiny"; of "ra-
tional relation" and "compelling interest." There is also something 
called "natural law," which always seems to be hovering about the 
cases, almost always ridiculed, and yet somehow never evaded, never 
quite expelled - and never explained as carefully as the other doc-
trines that claim a hold on the minds of the judges. 
The student is not likely to become wise to the distinction between 
"induction" and "deduction" on the basis of the account offered here 
(pp. 302-03), but that may be only a gentle preparation for the things 
to come: He is likely to find far more inscrutable the distinction be-
tween laws that restrict "fundamental" interests and require the most 
"compelling" justifications, and the kinds of laws for which the judges 
are quite affably willing to accept justifications that are lame, but good 
enough ("minimally rational"). 
But this willingness to begin with the most elementary points offers 
one of the distinctive - and appealing - marks of this book. Early in 
the work the writers are willing to raise questions about the sources of 
law outside the text of the Constitution, and they are willing to alert 
their students to the possibility that the Supreme Court may not be the 
5. 0. WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST (1959). 
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sole, authoritative interpreter of the Constitution. They are willing to 
consider, that is, that the President and the Congress may have stand-
ing to act as interpreters of the Constitution. And in filling out these 
questions, the authors are willing to draw on a range of writings that 
run beyond the decisions of the Court. As one might expect, they 
draw on the notable statements of Lincoln, Jefferson, and Jackson on 
the responsibility of the President to judge the measures that come 
under his hand. Suppose, for example, that the President were faced 
with an act of Congress that provided military conscription only for 
people of a minority race in this country. Would the President be 
obliged to consider only the "utility" of this measure as he weighed 
the possibility of a veto? Would he be obliged to consider only the 
question of whether the policy would "work," or would he be bound 
also to consider the question of whether the legislation was compatible 
with the principles of the American Constitution? 
The writers draw on the arguments made by the Presidents, but 
they also draw on the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1802,6 and the 
rival testimony that was offered in 1981 by Laurence Tribe and John 
Noonan over the Human Life Bill.7 With that measure, the President 
and the Congress sought to revise, through an ordinary act of legisla-
tion, the decision of the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. 8 In that deci-
sion, of course, the Court articulated a "constitutional right" to an 
abortion. The Court managed to achieve that end by treating, as an 
inscrutable religious issue, the question of when human life began.9 In 
1981 the Congress sought to relieve the puzzlement of the Court; Con-
gress began to assemble the evidence that seemed to go unnoticed by 
the Court, and to make a principled argument on this question that 
ran beyond the imagination of the majority in Roe v. Wade. In any 
event, the Congress proposed to flex its authority under the fourteenth 
amendment and revise this ruling made by the Court in Roe v. Wade: 
that the human fetus, the offspring of homo sapiens, was not a "per-
son" who came within the protections of the Constitution. 
The writers showed the right reflexes in connecting this enduring 
problem of constitutional authority to the current question of abor-
tion. They might have made the point even more tellingly if they had 
been willing to go a bit further afield and annex, to this collection of 
writings, the recent controversies over the War Powers Act. We have 
had the example, in recent years, of senators such as Gary Hart and 
Arlen Specter, who have scoffed at the Reagan administration for 
6. 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 614 (1802). 
7. The Human Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9. For an extended treatment of this question as it was handled by the Court, see H. ARKES, 
FIRST THINGS ch. XVI (1986). 
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adopting the understanding held by Lincoln about the authority of the 
President to interpret the Constitution. They have insisted that the 
President may not reject the constitutionality of the War Powers Act, 
and they have opposed the attempt of the Administration to revise, 
through ordinary legislation, the decision of the Court in Roe v. Wade. 
But at the same time, these senators have claimed for themselves pre-
cisely the kind of authority they have denied to the President: They 
have continued to regard the War Powers Act as constitutional, even 
after that Act has been called into question by a landmark decision of 
the Supreme Court. 10 
In June 1862, Lincoln and his Congress claimed the same author-
ity to act upon their own understanding of the Constitution. Congress 
abolished, slavery in all existing territories of the United States, and in 
all territories that might be formed or acquired in the future. As Pro-
fessor James Randall would later write of this legislation, "Congress 
passed and Lincoln signed an unconstitutional law, according to 
Supreme Court doctrine."11 What the President and Congress had 
done, in the most explicit and direct way, was to counter the decision 
of the Court in the Dred Scott case. 12 
These moves can be regarded as comprehensible and defensible 
only with the understanding held by Lincoln about the authority of 
the political branches and the limits to the authority of the Court. 
When Lincoln pledged his opposition to the Dred Scott decision, he 
conceded that he would be obliged, as President, to respect the judg-
ments of the Supreme Court. But the Court reached its judgments in 
cases in controversy, and so Lincoln was prepared to accept the judg-
ment of the Court as "binding in any case, upon the parties to a suit, 
as to the object of that suit, ... [and] limited to that particular case" 
(p. 229). What he was not obliged to accept was the principle or the 
broader rule of law articulated in the case. The power of the judges, in 
that respect, would have to depend, as Andrew Jackson said, solely on 
"the force of their reasoning" (p. 226). 
That perspective on the matter left the Administration and Con-
gress free to apply their own understanding of the Constitution in the 
decisions that arose in their own spheres. 13 With the legislation on the 
territories, it is worth bearing in mind that the political branches did 
not circumvent the Court: a case could have been generated; the stat-
ute could have been tested in the Supreme Court. The Court could 
10. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). I have had the occasion to explain this point 
more fully in a recent piece, Arkes, On the Moral Standing of the President as an Interpreter of 
the Constitution: $ome Reflections on Our Current "Crises", 20 PS 637 (1987). 
11. J. RANDALL, THE, CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 478 n.l (1937). 
12. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
13. I had the occasion to recall two cases in which the administration had the chance to act 
on this understanding in administrative decisions in reversing decisions of the Buchanan admin-
istration. See H. ARKES, supra note 9, at 421-22. 
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have held to its earlier position and struck down the new legislation. 
In that event, it might have been necessary for Congress to move to 
the level of a constitutional amendment. But on the other hand, the 
determined opposition of the Congress and the Administration might 
have induced the justices to take a sober second look at what they had 
done. Faced with the reasons assembled by Congress, faced with the 
determination of the political leadership, expressed in the solemn form 
of a statute, the Court could ~ven have come to the judgment that it 
might have been mistaken. After all, the justices have changed their 
minds before, when challenged in this way by the Congress. The con-
stitutional arrangements in America are open to this kind of exchange 
and challenge between the branches, and it is remarkable (to put it 
mildly) that some of our leading commentators on the Constitution 
seemed to forget about these precedents when they came to testify on 
the Human Life Bill. 
But Professor John Noonan did recall this history when he testified 
on behalf of the bill, and the writers of the casebook showed an un-
common judgment when they made a place in the book for his testi-
mony. But for some reason, they chose to delete two short 
paragraphs, which contained the most telling precedents in support of 
his position. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok14 and Prudential Insurance Co. 
v. Benjamin, 15 the Court backed away from earlier rulings on constitu-
tional questions, when the Congress persisted in taking a different view 
of the matter. 16 One would have gathered from the reaction of many 
professors, that there was something deeply illegitimate about the 
Human Life Bill, something deeply at odds with the tradition of the 
Constitution. In light of this reaction, it seems odd that the compilers 
could not find room for the two short paragraphs, which might be 
decisive in dissolving the kinds of objections raised against the Human 
Life Bill. And yet, that is not the only remarkable omission, or the 
only point of curiosity, in the arrangement of the cases. 
The principal case on abortion appears late in the book; the reader 
finds it placed, well along, in a group of cases that have been collected 
under the title of "The Right to Bodily Integrity" (p. 1105). Roe v. 
Wade is preceded in this group by Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 11 a 
venerable case from 1905 on compulsory vaccination. But the reader 
finds a note, referring him back in the book for the text of the Jacobson 
case. The reader may recall that he had seen Jacobson at page 91 (over 
1,000 pages earlier). If not, or if he is not inclined just then to track 
the case down and read it again, he will not have the text before him as 
14. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). 
15. 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
16. Noonan's testimony is reprinted in Noonan, In re the ''Human Life Bill," 7 HUMAN 
LIFE REV. 65 (1981). 
17. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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he approaches Roe v. Wade. He may not then recall the words of 
Justice Harlan in strongly rejecting the claim to "the inherent right of 
every freeman to care for his own body,"18 a claim that may be used 
to evade a public policy on vaccination, or perhaps even a policy that 
requires a citizen to make his body available in response to a subpoena 
or a draft notice. 
But then, in the spirit of Sherlock Holmes, the mind is instantly 
drawn to the most notable "dog that wasn't barking": the most obvi-
ous omission in this section is Schmerber v. California. 19 In that case, 
Justice Brennan justified the penetration of the body, and the extrac-
tion of blood, from a man who was suspected of drunken driving. In 
Schmerber and its progeny,20 the Court has virtually made a nullity of 
Rochin v. California, 21 the famous "stomach pump" case. The interest 
of the law in obtaining evidence, in rendering an accurate verdict on 
guilt and innocence, may override the claim of any person to have his 
body touched, pierced, penetrated, only with his consent. Is there any 
wonder why this case was omitted from the section containing Roe v. 
Wade? Its inclusion might have exposed the title of the section (The 
Right to Bodily Integrity) as a convenient cliche, and it would have 
made this point plain: If there is anything "wrong" about an abortion; 
if an abortion may represent, in certain cases, the assault on another 
body, the taking of a life, without justification; then the claim of a 
woman to her "bodily integrity" could not function as a shield to 
block off the child from the protection of the law. 
Even more directly to the point, the reader will not find any refer-
ence in this section to Connecticut v. Menillo. 22 The Court made it 
clear in that case that the right to an abortion had never been based on 
any claim to "the control of one's own body." If that premise had 
been critical to Roe v. Wade, then a woman should indeed have been 
free to take her own risks with her own body and have her abortion in 
an unlicensed clinic. But the Court has insisted, from the beginning, 
that the state may require the operations to take place in a hospital or 
a licensed clinic, at the hands of a licensed physician; and that position 
was affirmed by the Court in M enillo. 23 These provisions for safety are 
the only regulations that the Court has been willing to sustain in re-
stricting the freedom of a woman to choose an abortion. And yet, that 
point has been quite enough to remind us that the decision in Roe was 
never based on a sovereign right to dispose of one's own body. 
18. 197 U.S. at 26. 
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
20. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 
21. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
22. 423 U.S. 9 (1975). 
23. More recently, this position has been refined, but nevertheless sustained, by the Court in 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 431-39 (1983). 
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It is not at all implausible, of course, to place Roe v. Wade under a 
rubric of "bodily integrity." But it is curious, and it invites one to 
ponder other plausible rubrics. What about: "defining persons" -
the problem of considering just who is an agent bearing rights? Dead 
people, with wills? Animals? Members of endangered species, like 
sandhill cranes? Nonhumans, then, as well as humans? Roe v. Wade 
might have been placed next to Dred Scott: Before the reader perused 
the reasoning of Justice Blackmun, he might have been exposed to a 
far more strenuous and detailed exercise on the part of Chief Justice 
Taney, in his effort to show that the black man had never been re-
garded as a person bearing rights under the Constitution. In compari-
son to Taney's effort, Blackmun's scraps of evidence would have been 
seen as rather scanty, as he set out to argue that the "persons" men-
tioned in the Constitution were not, apparently, prenatal. But of 
course, a comparison would have been embarrassing, and perhaps 
even provocative, and it would have suggested a rather emphatic argu-
ment, even without the tendering of a word. I do not mean to suggest 
that in failing to take a position of this kind the writers have taken, by 
implication, a benign, supportive view of abortion. My own hunch is 
that the writers sought to take a posture of judicious detachment on 
this issue to raise a number of critical questions, without appearing to 
lead the reader in either way on this vexing matter. 
And yet, certain curious points remain. I was mildly surprised, for 
example, to see the writers remark that Roe v. Wade had created a 
right to an abortion "at least during the first trimester" (p. 125). For 
over a decade the New York Times and the Washington Post continued 
to misinstruct their readers in this way. It is only recently that these 
newspapers have begun to put out the correct account as a matter of 
standard practice: viz., that the right to an abortion, created by the 
Court, extends throughout the entire length of the pregnancy. The 
Court in Roe did divide the pregnancy into trimesters, and it suggested 
that the state may have an interest, in the later stages, in protecting 
"potential life." But the Court also explained that this interest of the 
state could be overridden by the interest of the pregnant woman in her 
own health, and the Court made clear, in the companion case of Doe v. 
Bolton, 24 that "health" included the "mental health" of the mother. 
As Justice Blackmun put it, the health of the mother would have to be 
estimated in a medical judgment that took into account "all factors -
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age -
relevant to [her] well-being."25 
In other words, if a woman suffered any "distress" in being denied 
an abortion, that distress would be sufficient in itself to justify the 
abortion. And in point of fact, the Court has not yet sustained any 
24. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
25. 410 U.S. 179, 192; Accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
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efforts on the part of the states to forbid, or even restrict, the perform-
ance of abortion in the late stages of pregnancy, for the sake of pro-
tecting the child. I took the remark of the writers then as a casual slip, 
but I was surprised to see the same point repeated further along in the 
book (pp. 194, 898). At the same time, the authors failed to include 
any excerpt from Doe v. Bolton that might have shown how radical, in 
fact, was this new right to an abortion created by the Court. How to 
account for all of this? Why would the writers state persistently a 
point they must know is not true? What they happen to conceal, in 
this way, are the features that have made the laws on abortion in the 
United States the most radical in the West. Would they make that 
concealment, or that decorous muting, a part of their own project? 
I think not. I detect, as I say, no zeal on the part of the writers to 
promote this cause. And a note in the book may offer a clue to their 
intention. The writers direct the reader to a chapter in The Vicar of 
Christ, the highly successful novel published by Walter Murphy in 
1979. The central figure in the novel is a Catholic who becomes Chief 
Justice of the United States. The experience of the Court induces the 
protagonist - as it might induce anyone with serious, philosophic in-
terests - to retire into a monastery. From there he is launched on a 
new ascent that carries him -brace yourself - to the papacy. Before 
he leaves the Court, Declan Walsh (the central character) presides, as 
Chief Justice, over the famous abortion cases. Murphy uses the occa-
sion to reconstruct the conversations, or the arguments, among the 
justices, and he reveals, of course, the reach of his own imagination on 
this question. The most serious concession that Walsh seems to make 
to the defenders of abortion is to credit their puzzlement over the 
question of when a fetus becomes a "human being." For Walsh, it is 
hard to imagine that the offspring of a human may tum out to be a 
sunflower or a sandhill crane, but he is willing to accept, for the sake 
of argument, that the fetus may be only a "potential" human. Still, he 
notes that the Court, in the past, considered corporations as "per-
sons," and some of his liberal colleagues were willing to regard trees 
and animals as having a certain standing to receive the protection of 
the law in policies on the "environment." In a memorandum for his 
brethren on the Court, Walsh writes: 
I feel compelled by the laws of evidence, sensory perception, and plain 
common sense to conclude that one cannot, with any degree of rational-
ity whatsoever, simultaneously hold that a ship, a corporation, or even a 
bear is a person, and a fetus formed by the union of two human cells and 
growing within the womb of a human mother is not a person.26 
This memorandum is offered in a losing cause. In a narrow deci-
sion of 5-4, Walsh's colleagues reject his argument, and favor "the 
26. w. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST 198 (1979). For the fuller "conversation" on this 
question see id. at chapter 9. 
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rights of the person we know to be a human being," or, as the cause is 
described elsewhere, the "right," on the part of a woman, "to control 
her own body and thus to expel the fetus."27 Perhaps Murphy has 
been clever in disguising his position; for all we know, his own position 
may be closer to the adversaries of Walsh. But the writer who com-
posed this chapter had to understand that the "right of control over 
one's body" simply could not supply the ground of justification for the 
rulings in the abortion cases. For the same reason, he would have to 
know that the question of abortion could not be plausibly framed, in 
the casebook, under a "Right to Bodily Integrity." Murphy chooses 
to present the question of abortion, in the casebook, under the same 
"principle" that Declan Walsh recognizes, in the novel, as an empty 
slogan. With this move, Murphy may register a melancholy judg-
ment: It may be hard to enlist a discussion of this contentious ques-
tion on terms that depart too radically from the terms that have now 
settled in our public discourse. Or, this decision on the part of Mur-
phy may mark a troubled move in prudence: For Murphy to unfold 
more of his own understanding is to take the risk of having the 
casebook branded as an "anti-abortion" book. That would be quite 
enough to insure that the book will be decorously passed by for use in 
the "better" schools. If this conjecture is right, then Murphy and his 
colleagues might have sought to avoid the problem by straining to pre-
serve a parity in the arguments over abortion. In order to preserve 
that balance, they have had to screen from the book some of the most 
imaginative and compelling writing. But more than that, they have 
had to block out critical precedents, and even basic facts about the 
current arrangements of the law, lest they be "altogether too exciting," 
or, possibly, too embarrassing for the defenders of abortion. 
Yet there is no gainsaying that the writers of this casebook are very 
much committed to that project in jurisprudence in which the "right 
to an abortion" has found its place. Any label we place on this move-
ment is bound to be misleading. Let us say that this project has been 
marked by a willingness on the part of judges to cast off their beamish 
tolerance for the legislation of states, so long as the rationale for the 
legislation is even faintly plausible. This refusal to accept reasons that 
are simply good enough, this insistence on asking demanding ques-
tions, marks the temper that the writers seem to have in mind when 
they urge their readers to "reaffirm our commitment to the Constitu-
tion." But this constitutional temper splits the Court into factions, 
with almost every justice first on one side, and next on the other. The 
writers of this casebook seem to mirror that division within them-
selves, and the division in their own minds marks the tension that per-
vades this book. 
If only there had not been the 1930s and the reaction of the courts 
27. Id. at 191, 195. 
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to the New Deal: if the courts had not been so swollen with convic-
tion, so willing to strike down legislation on minimum wages or child 
labor, the liberal jurists could have avoided the reactions that would 
make them into caricatures of themselves for the next fifty years. 
They might have been less inclined then to regard moral conviction as 
a sign of arrogance. They might not have rejected "natural law" as 
the ideology of political reaction, the cover for "laissez-faire" econom-
ics. And they would not have been driven to their madcap deference 
to legislatures, their willingness to have the Court recede from any 
faintly rigorous testing of any law, so long as it touched on "economic 
regulations." When the liberals would be driven to protect civil rights 
and civil liberties, they would be driven, of course, to restore moral 
conviction to the judges. They did not wish to utter the dread words 
"natural rights," but they wished the judges to believe again in certain 
standards of right and wrong that did not depend on the sufferance of 
local majorities. 
Precisely where they would find the ground of these rights, they 
could not say. After all, they were spending their careers in affirming 
the grounds of "positivism," in philosophy and law, and denying the 
existence of moral truths in the strictest sense. That issue continues to 
affiict our modern jurists, both liberal and conservative, and it affiicts 
the authors of this casebook. And it may explain why the liberal ju-
rists in the 1930s were driven to cope with the problem, not by seeking 
to establish again the ground of rights and moral truths, but by creat-
ing "tiers" of rights: They would continue to encourage judges to sus-
pend their critical judgment and defer to the legislatures, but they 
would try to confine that official witlessness to matters of "economic 
regulation" and property rights. On the other hand, they would en-
courage the courts to begin marking off certain "preferred" freedoms 
- e.g., freedom of speech and association - which deserved, in their 
judgment, a more strenuous protection. Laws restricting these free-
doms would engage judges who were equipped, once again, with criti-
cal faculties, and a willingness to apply a "strict scrutiny." In this 
spirit, the Court would later try to mark off "fundamental rights." 
From the pattern of these cases the justices would later discern a right 
of "marriage," "procreation," "privacy." And, of course, the claims 
to privacy would later encompass the right to an abortion. 
But these are merely the elaborations, and the writers of the 
casebook see clearly on this point: The whole enterprise begins with 
Harlan Stone's famous footnote, buried in the Carolene Products 
case. 28 In that note, Stone expressed a willingness to withdraw "the 
presumption of constitutionality" from legislation when it "appears on 
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments." Stone also spoke of a willingness 
28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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to engage in a "more exacting judicial scrutiny" when legislation "re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation." That scrutiny would 
become engaged, also, when legislation threatened certain "discrete 
and insular minorities," who were the victims of local prejudice, and 
who could not command the leverage to protect themselves, politi-
cally, in their towns or states (pp. 489-90, passim). 
From these modest points, tucked away in a footnote, the cast of 
our recent jurisprudence was formed, with its tiers of "preferred" 
(and, by implication, "unpreferred") freedoms, with "rights" that 
were "fundamental" (and, apparently, "rights" that were not so fun-
damental or important). The writers were correct, I think, in taking 
Stone's footnote as the pivot in their casebook: For the remaining 700 
pages, the cases are arranged according to the cast that the justices 
came to accept for themselves as they accepted the language, and all of 
the awkwardnesses, that flowed from this jurisprudence. As the au-
thors observe, "[Stone's] footnote 4 continues to be the hinge on which 
much of modem constitutional argument turns" (p. 493). 
At the same time, the justices launched themselves on a course of 
philosophic incoherence from which they still have not been able to 
recover. For example, the "fundamental rights" to marry or to pro-
create were never meant to suggest that marriage and procreation 
could not be restricted by the law. The law could fix the age of con-
sent, it could bar the marriage of blood relatives, it could confine mar-
riage to "couples," it could insist that both partners be human, and of 
different sexes. In the famous Skinner case on sterilization,29 both Jus-
tices Douglas and Stone sought to avoid any collision with Justice 
Holmes's odious opinion on sterilization in Buck v. Bell 30 ("The prin-
ciple that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are 
enough").31 Apparently, there was nothing categorical about "funda-
mental rights." Whenever they could be restricted in any case with 
justification, the law could restrict them. It was hard to see, then, just 
why they were more fundamental than the "right" to walk down the 
street, or the right not to be confined to one's own home. In fact, a 
serious case could be made that many of these cases were misdescribed 
- that the signal cases on "marriage" or "privacy" did not require 
any appeal at all to those concepts for the sake of settling the case at 
hand. 32 These strains of coherence could be felt early on, as the Court 
began to work within the lines marked off by Stone's footnote. In 
1943, Felix Frankfurter began to question, for the first time, the very 
29. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
30. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
31. 274 U.S. at 207. 
32. For an extended explanation on these points, see H. ARKES, supra note 9, at ch. XV. 
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coherence of suggesting a hierarchy or ranking in constitutional 
principles:33 
The Constitution does not give us greater veto power when dealing with 
one phase of "liberty" than with another. . . . [The authority of the 
Court] does not vary according to the particular provision of the Bill of 
Rights which is invoked. The right not to have property taken without 
just compensation has, so far as the scope of judicial power is concerned, 
the same constitutional dignity as the right to be protected against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, and the latter has no less claim than free-
dom of the press or freedom of speech or religious freedom. 34 
The writers perform the service of pointing up this passage in their 
commentary, as well as reprinting the fuller opinion. And yet, it be-
comes evident in the course of the book that this passage does not 
enlist them. It does not engage their sentiments, it does not summon 
their powers of argument in defense of Frankfurter, and it does not 
even inspire their willingness, finally, to understand the argument. To 
take Frankfurter seriously here, one would have to return to the un-
derstanding of the Founders, and the Founders made no discrimina-
tion between "economic" liberties and other kinds of freedoms. The 
Founders understood simply a "regime of liberty," in which people 
had a presumptive claim to their freedom, in all of its dimensions, 
unless there was a compelling reason that justified the restrictions of 
the law. When the law barred the access of aliens, or a racial minor-
ity, to certain occupations, was that an "economic" regulation? Or 
was it simply, as the jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
were wont to regard it: an arbitrary restriction of personal freedom? 
The writers take note of that argument, but they are held back, and 
what seems to hold them back is an unwillingness to break with the 
liberal faith of the 1930s and 1940s. To put it another way, they are 
reluctant to admit the emptiness of the legal arguments that were pro-
duced in defense of the New Deal. That reluctance produces an am-
bivalence, which may be read in cases of this kind. 
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 35 a local ordinance limited the 
occupancy in each dwelling unit to members of a single family, and the 
definition of "family" was confined to the nuclear family, with parents 
and their children. In this case the ordinance was applied against a 
woman who shared her home with her son and two grandsons; but the 
grandsons happened to be cousins and not brothers. In a plurality 
opinion, the Court overturned the conviction and raised some search-
ing questions about the coherence of the regulation. Still, four justices 
dissented from this interference with the authority of a local govern-
33. For a more demanding argument on this point, going back to Aquinas, see id. at 161-65. 
34. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J. dissent-
ing). This passage is quoted in the casebook at pp. 492, 1031. 
35. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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ment to make regulations on housing. Justice White expressed a cer-
tain unease over the prospect of launching the Court, again, on a 
course of "substantive due process": Were the justices really prepared 
to test the content, and the essential "reasonableness," of any local 
ordinance? White invoked the spirit of Justice Black and his "con-
stant reminder to his colleagues that the Court has no license to invali-
date legislation which it thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable."36 
My hunch is that the writers of this book are drawn to the side of 
those judges who would not settle, in these cases, with reasons that 
had merely a surface plausibility. Their hearts, I think, are on the side 
of the judges who are willing to look through the record, look through 
the layers of invention and official rationales, and demand a more ex-
acting justification for a statute. And yet not entirely: I think the 
writers share the kind of ambivalence expressed by Justice White. 
They want judges who are prepared to defend "rights" in a tough-
minded way; but they are reluctant to license the authority of the 
judges to begin testing again, wi~h a demanding standard, the host of 
regulations passed by local governments on matters like zoning and 
rent control and the redistribution of land. The one conviction the 
writers are unwilling to give up is the conviction that the judges who 
opposed the economic "reforms" of the New Deal were deeply, endur-
ingly, irretrievably wrong. The deepest contempt of the writers is ex-
pressed for the jurisprudence of Sutherland, McReynolds, and 
Peckham. But the deepest source of embarrassment for them is that 
the jurisprudence they want in their own day - the jurisprudence of 
active judges protecting "fundamental rights" -was opposed, most 
fiercely, by the jurists of the New Deal. No one expended more pas-
sion in attacking "substantive due process" and the Conservative 
Court than Hugo Black, Franklin Roosevelt's first appointee to the 
Court. And yet, no one was more vocal in opposing the creation of a 
"right to privacy" in Griswold v. Connecticut37 or, for that matter, the 
invention of new "rights" against local governments.38 
The memorable justices of the New Deal - Black, Stone, Frank-
furter - cannot supply the moral ground for the new jurisprudence 
sought by the writers. That ground can be supplied only by judges 
who understand that they are governed by a discipline of moral rea-
soning even when they exercise discretion. Judges gifted with that un-
derstanding know that they can call upon far more than their 
"subjective opinions," or their "political ideologies," when they pre-
sume to challenge the legislation of a state. In short, the project re-
quires judges with authentic moral conviction - not judges who think 
36. 431 U.S. at 544. 
37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
38. For example, see Black's dissenting opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 
U.S. 503 (1969), and the recollections of Justice White in Moore, 431 U.S. at 544. 
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that what is right or wrong really depends on the notions that are 
"posited" or stipulated by the majority in any place. It may not mat-
ter whether we call this body of conviction by the name of "natural 
law," or the "principles of law," or the "canons of moral reasoning." 
But the judges who find, in these notions, a discipline of judgment, will 
be readily distinguishable from the judges who regard the exercise (as 
Bentham regarded "natural law") as a species of "nonsense on stilts." 
If the writers of the casebook sought the justices who took these 
matters seriously, they would find them, most conspicuously, in the 
Conservative Court at the end of the nineteenth century and the begin-
ning of the twentieth. They would find their true ancestors in George 
Sutherland, John Harlan, and Stephen Field. When the Court in our 
own day brought forth a "right to an abortion," it drew that right 
from a chain of cases that seemed to disclose an emerging "right to 
privacy." Four or five cases were critical in this chain; two of them 
were Meyer v. Nebraska39 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.40 The opin-
ions in both cases were written by the hateful William McReynolds. 
As the writers note, McReynolds was a bitter anti-Semite. He was 
appointed by a liberal President (Wilson), but he became marked as a 
political "reactionary," a reliable member of the "Four Horsemen" of 
the Court (Sutherland, McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler), the 
justices who preserved a steady opposition to the measures of the New 
Deal. And yet, the record of the modem Court offers a silent homage 
to the Court of Sutherland, Field, and Peckham. When the justices 
seek, in our own day, the most compelling statements for the defense 
of personal rights against the arbitrary restrictions of the law, the 
strongest antecedents are still to be found in the jurisprudence pro-
duced by Sutherland and his forebears. 
* * * 
The writers remark that "'[t]o Lochner' or 'to Lochnerize' has 
become a term of opprobrium referring to judges' reading their per-
sonal preferences about fundamental rights into the Constitution" (p. 
980). The writers refer, of course, to the case of Lochner v. New 
York, 41 and to the opinion written by the cantankerous Rufus 
Peckham. In that case, the Court struck down a New York state law 
that limited the working time of bakers to sixty hours per week. That 
case has been ridiculed by conservatives as well as liberals, and it has 
often been joined to Adkins v. Children's Hospital 42 to form a model of 
the Conservative Court at its reactionary worst. In Adkins, the Court 
struck down a District of Columbia law that established a schedule of 
minimum wages for women in different occupations. The opinion of 
39. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
40. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
41. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
42. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
1508 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1492 
the Court was written by the scholarly, thoughtful George Sutherland, 
whom the writers of the casebook regard as the very caricature of a 
political neanderthal. There are disparaging allusions to his motives, 
and he is described, most politely, as an "ardent defender of economic 
laissez-faire" (p. 1092). For the writers, Sutherland and Peckham re-
flected the tendency of the courts to invoke the "freedom of contract" 
as a nearly cynical device to favor the interests of business over work-
ers. The bakers would be "protected" in their freedom to "contract," 
and their employers would compel them to contract for more than 
sixty hours per week. 
And yet, in recent years, scholars have encouraged us to take an-
other look at these decisions, and the work of the so-called Conserva-
tive Court. Bernard Siegan has taken a searching view of the record of 
that Court, and he has shown that the classic "liberalism" of the Court 
was not in fact confined to the protection of "economic liberties."43 
The justices protected liberties from arbitrary restriction, quite apart 
from whether the liberties were manifested in business or in other do-
mains, and at times it was hard to tell the difference. In Truax v. 
Raich, 44 the Court struck down a statute that required employers of 
more than five persons to employ native-born citizens or qualified elec-
tors for at least eighty percent of the jobs. It takes a mind of special 
calibration to regard this judgment as a defense of "economic liber-
ties." The Court removed an arbitrary restriction on the liberty of 
persons who were resident aliens; and that restriction happened to 
bear on the freedom to earn a living. In the case of Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 45 the Court considered restrictions on the freedom to purchase 
insurance from firms outside the state. In framing its judgment, this 
supposedly Conservative Court articulated one of the most expansive 
understandings of the range of personal freedom protected under the 
fourteenth amendment: 
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of 
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by 
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen 
to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties,· to be free to use them in all 
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that pur-
pose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and es-
sential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above 
mentioned. 46 
The author of this passage was the vilified Rufus Peckham. But it 
became critical, in fixing the political understanding of liberalism, to 
43. See B. S!EGAN, EcONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980) (especially chap-
ters 5-7). 
44. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
45. 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
46. 165 U.S. at 589 (emphasis added). 
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stamp justices like Peckham and Sutherland with caricatures. Even 
with the estimable men who have assembled this casebook, it appears 
that the caricatures have taken such a secure hold that the authors are 
no longer able to see that the actual words of the justices - the words 
they have reprinted in their book - do not quite support the labels 
they have been content to stamp on these men. If the Adkins case 
were read again, read without preconception, Sutherland's opinion 
could be seen as an urbane and devastating commentary. The case for 
minimum wages was tested against a tutored jural sense, and the result 
was to expose the silliness and pretension of the local regulations. In 
this case, one of the suits was brought by a woman, Ms. Willie Lyons, 
who was more than content to work as the operator of an elevator in 
the Congress Hall Hotel at the wage she was offered ($35 per week). 
Her employers would have been pleased to retain her, but they were 
compelled to let her go, because they could not afford to keep her on at 
the wage stipulated by the ordinance in the District of Columbia. Ms. 
Lyons testified that she had not been able to find a better job with 
better pay in surroundings as congenial to her. The law worked, then, 
to deprive her of a job that her employers were willing to offer, and 
which she was quite pleased to accept. 
In the course of his opinion, Sutherland exposed the want of stan-
dards by which any official board could possibly judge the precise 
wage that was necessary, in any case, to preserve women "in good 
health and to protect [their] morals."47 He remarked on the awkward 
pretension of claiming to know that it required a wage of $16.50 per 
week to preserve the health and morals of a woman employed in the 
serving of food, while a wage of $9 per week might be sufficient to 
preserve the moral character of beginners in a laundry.48 In his career 
in the Senate, Sutherland had led the movement to enfranchise wo-
men. In 1915, he introduced the amendment to the Constitution on 
women's suffrage, and the amendment became known by his name. In 
the Adkins case, he defended the competence of mature women to un-
derstand their own interests and enter into contracts for employment 
with their own consent. As Bernard Siegan has suggested, Suther-
land's language in this case would actually be far more in keeping with 
the modern temper of feminism than the patronizing view of women 
that was reflected in the regulations of the District of Columbia. 49 
Sutherland observed that 
the ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, . . . has con-
tinued "with diminishing intensity." In view of the great - not to say 
revolutionary - changes which have taken place ... in the contractual, 
political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth 
47. 261 U.S. at 555. 
48. 261 U.S. at 556. 
49. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 43, at 148. 
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Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have 
now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point. In this aspect of 
the matter, while the physical differences must be recognized in appro-
priate cases, and legislation fixing hours or conditions of work may prop-
erly take them into account, we cannot accept the doctrine that women 
of mature age, sui juris, require or may be subjected to restrictions upon 
their liberty of contract which could not lawfully be imposed in the case 
of men under similar circumstances. 50 
Of Rufus Peckham, the memoirs and letters of the times are chill-
ingly void of any fond, or benign remembrance. Yet, Peckham's opin-
ion in Lochner draws on some of the same, urbane skepticism that one 
may find in Sutherland: "Not only the hours of employes, but the 
hours of employers, could be regulated, and doctors, lawyers, scien-
tists, all professional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be 
forbidden to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of ex-
ercise .... "51 I know several young people, with newly minted degrees 
in law, putting in sixty hours a week as first-year associates in major 
firms. I also know of professors .who routinely work more than sixty 
hours a week at their vocations. Could we imagine any "principle" 
that would tell us that these people had endangered their own well-
being when they decided, for their own reasons, to commit these hours 
to their work? The usual retort is that these professionals have far 
more choice about their work than the bakers in New York at the tum 
of the century. But that reaction underlines the assumption that has 
always been engaged here: namely, that the workers involved in these 
cases had no practicable freedom to move from bakeries into other 
kinds of work, or to shift from one bakery to another if they found the 
terms of employment uncongenial. 
And yet, as Bernard Siegan has discovered, there was a high degree 
of competition among the bakeries in New York at the time of the 
Lochner case. In fact, some further research into the origins of the law 
turns up this piece of intelligence: The movement to impose a limit on 
hours was supported mainly by the larger, "corporate" bakeries in 
New York. The imposition of a law on maximum hours became a 
highly useful device for raising the labor costs for their small competi-
tors among the new immigrants, who were able to operate in modest, 
"subterranean" quarters, with lower costs in "overhead."52 
50. 261 U.S. at 553. 
51. 198 U.S. at 60 (reprinted at p. 977). 
52. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 43, at 116-18. The effect of the law might have been reflected 
in these figures reported by Siegan: 
In 1899, only 2 percent of the baking establishments were owned by corporations, as com-
pared with 7 percent in 1919. During this period the corporate portion of the industry's 
output rose from 28.7 to 51.8 percent. Between 1909 and 1919, the average number of 
wage-earners in corporate-controlled bakeries was about forty-four, as contrasted with an 
average work force of fewer than three people in the bakeries under other forms of 
ownership. 
Id. at 116. 
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"Liberty of contract": This was the term used by Peckham and 
Sutherland, and which has been treated by the writers of the casebook 
as a code word for "laissez-faire economics." But Sutherland wrote in 
Adkins that "[t]here is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom of 
contract. It is subject to a great variety of restraints. . . . The liberty 
of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, is not 
absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good .... "53 Suth-
erland went on to discuss the variety of laws that may properly restrict 
the "freedom of contract": laws that protect workers against fraud in 
measuring their work and their compensation, laws that restrict the 
hours of work in mines and smelters under conditions that are likely 
to be hazardous. 54 Sutherland sought to explain just what separated 
the regulations on minimum wages from the kinds of regulations that 
he regarded as legitimate. But this section is omitted from the 
casebook, along with the distinctions that he sought to explain. Still, 
the casebook does record Justice Peckham, in Lochner, making the 
same allowances. Peckham reminded his readers that "[t]he State ... 
has the power to prevent the individual from making certain kinds of 
contracts ... [e.g.,] a contract to let one's property for immoral pur-
poses, or to do any other unlawful act" (p. 975). 
Is this "laissez-faire?" Not if one understands "laissez-faire" in the 
simple slogans of the political marketplace, where it has been identi-
fied with the rejection of all legal restraints on commerce. But the 
classic doctrines of "laissez-faire" were never understood in this way, 
because the classic notions of economics were never disconnected from 
moral philosophy. Adam Smith, we may recall, was a professor of 
moral philosophy. The classic defenders of the "regime of liberty" in 
economics never assumed that the marketplace of exchange would be 
free from all legal and moral restraints. Writers such as Smith, Burke, 
and Turgot assumed that the law would be in place to do what it was 
ever the mission of the law to do: to mark off the difference between 
the legitimate and the illegitimate, and therefore, to mark off the kinds 
of activities that could never become the legitimate objects of contracts 
and exchange. It was never assumed, for example, that people would 
be free to make contracts over prostitution so long as there were peo-
ple in the marketplace who were willing to demand and supply these 
services. 
At the same time, the defenders of the "regime of personal liberty" 
understood the moral significance that attached to the "liberty of con-
tract." Only a certain kind of creature had the competence to make 
contracts. Dogs and horses could not make promises and bear obliga-
tions. The notion of a "contract" implied "moral agents," who could 
enter, knowingly, into a commitment and bear an obligation. It was 
53. 261 U.S. at 546, 561. 
54. 261 U.S. at 547-48. 
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also understood that a moral obligation could not arise from an act of 
brute coercion. As Rousseau remarked, a highwayman may force us, 
at the point of a gun, to hand over our money, but we would not have 
a "duty" to hand it over.ss A promise may be binding only when it is 
accepted, freely, without coercion - when it is accepted, that is, with 
the "consent" of the contracting party. In other words, this "freedom 
to contract" was understood, at the beginning, as grounded in the 
premises of "natural rights." It began with an understanding of the 
things that separated human beings, in nature, from beings that did 
not have the competence of moral agents. And it was drawn then 
from the same premises that established "government by consent" as 
the only legitimate form of government over human beings: No obli-
gations could arise from contracts that were not entered freely, with 
the "consent" of the parties; and no arrangements of government 
could be binding without establishing the same "consent" on the part 
of the governed. 
These connections were understood by jurists in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, but the passages that reflect this understanding 
are typically edited out of our casebooks. Perhaps they are regarded 
now as passages that bear little interest for contemporary readers. 
One essay that usually receives a heavy hand of splicing is that magis-
terial, dissenting opinion by Stephen Field in the Slaughter-House 
Cases. s6 Toward the end of the opinion Field added a footnote, in 
which he recalled an edict issued by Louis XVI in 1776, but written by 
·his minister, Turgot. That edict began the dismantling of state mo-
nopolies and guilds, which restricted the access of workmen even to 
common occupations. The statement merits our rediscovery, after so 
many years, because it expresses the connection that was once taken 
for granted between freedom in the economy and "natural rights." 
The king began by praising the guilds and trading companies, but his 
statement then took this turn: 
It was the allurement of these fiscal advantages undoubtedly that pro-
longed the illusion and concealed the immense injury [that the guilds] 
did to industry and their infraction of natural right. This illusion had 
extended so far that some persons asserted that the right to work was a 
royal privilege which the king might sell, and that his subjects were 
bound to purchase from him. We hasten to correct this error and repel 
the conclusion. God in giving to man wants and desires rendering labor 
necessary for their satisfaction, conferred the right to labor upon all men, 
and this property is the first, most sacred, and imprescriptible of all .... 
[T]herefore [the King] regards it as the first duty of his justice, and the 
worthiest act of benevolence, to free his subjects from any restrictions 
55. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. I, ch. 3 (R. Harrington trans. 1893). 
56. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-111 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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upon this inalienable right of humanity.57 
In one of the famous Cherokee cases, Worcester v. Georgia, 58 John 
Marshall offered an engaging essay into the history of the first en-
counters between the Indians and the British on this continent. For 
the modem reader, the account has a nearly precious quality in reflect-
ing an age marked by a different sensibility. As Marshall retells the 
story, the British established, decisively, their superiority at arms, 
which meant that they were in a position virtually to dictate the terms 
of any settlement; and yet, the British government felt obliged to hold 
back on a point of propriety. The British were reluctant to invoke the 
"rule of the strong" and claim the right of the victor to treat the van-
quished as slaves or underlings. The British won at war, but they 
would settle their relations with the Indians now through the device of 
"treaties" (or contracts), and they would acquire the lands of the Indi-
ans through contracts of purchase. As the Chief Justice remarked: 
[It was understood among the European powers ~hat their dominant po-
sition] could not affect the rights of those already in possession [of the 
land], either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a dis-
covery made before the memory of man. [The Europeans could claim a 
right to purchase] but did not found that right on a denial of the right of 
the possessor to sell. 
The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on the 
sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legiti-
mate power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea 
to sea, did not enter the mind of any man. They were well understood to 
convey the title which, according to the common law of European sover-
eigns respecting America, they might rightfully convey, and no more. 
This was the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were 
willing to sell. The crown could not be understood to grant what the 
crown did not affect to claim. 59 
But why was this the case? The fact that the British might be 
dominant at arms was not taken to extinguish the right of the Indians 
to "contract" over what was theirs. In a speech in Mobile in 1763, the 
British superintendent of Indian Affairs declared to the Indians assem-
bled that "whenever you shall be pleased to surrender any of your 
territories to his majesty, it must be done, for the future, at a public 
meeting of your nation, when the gove~ors of the provinces, or the 
superintendent shall be present, and obtain the consent of all your peo-
ple. "60 That is, even aborigines deserved to be bound only with their 
consent. They merited, also, the kinds of public procedures that might 
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 110-11 n* (quoting edict of Louis XVI) (emphasis added and in 
original). 
58. 31 U.S (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
59. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 54445. 
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 547 (emphasis added). 
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insure that the consent was offered knowingly (or, as we might say 
today, that the consent was "informed"). I would suggest that these 
fastidious arrangements could be explained only if we take seriously 
the understanding of the time: that the right to enter into contracts, 
and to be bound only by consent, was not merely a "conventional" 
right, but a "natural" right. It could be accorded then, with propriety, 
to any moral agent, including an aborigine. 
Anyone who has studied the history of our law would know that 
this was hardly a trivial point. For Marshall it mattered profoundly, 
in Gibbons v. Ogden, 61 and in Ogden v. Saunders, 62 that "individuals 
do not derive from government their right to contract, but bring that 
right with them into society; that obligation is not conferred on con-
tracts by positive law, but is intrinsic, and is conferred by the act of the 
parties":63 
If, on tracing the right to contract, and the obligations created by con-
tract, to their source, we find them to exist anterior to, and independent 
of society, we may reasonably conclude that those original and pre-ex-
isting principles are, like many other natural rights, brought with man 
into society; and, although they may be controlled, are not given by 
human legislation. 64 
Even in the state of nature, human beings could make promises to 
one another, and the obligation to keep the promise would remain, 
regardless of whether the parties remained in a primitive state, without 
government, or suddenly found themselves in civil society. If the right 
to contract does not arise from positive law, then neither may the obli-
gations of contract be extinguished by positive law. The law may re-
strain contracts that are in principle illegitimate, but the government 
may not claim, so casually, the authority to extinguish, through posi-
tive law, the obligation to repay a debt, or to honor any other promise, 
solemnly recorded in a contract. Marshall drew this further implica-
tion in Gibbons v. Ogden: Since the right to engage in contracts or 
commerce cannot arise from the government, it cannot be within the 
just authority of the government to "annihilate" this commerce. 
Hence the language of the Constitution - that the Congress may 
"regulate" commerce; it may affect commerce with all rightful re-
straints; but it may not claim the right to ban innocent commerce, 
directed to legitimate ends. 6s 
I merely pick out here a few threads from the rich weave of our 
early cases; they could be supplemented, handsomely, by passages 
61. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
62. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
63. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 346; (emphasis added). 
64. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 345. 
65. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193, 211. 
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drawn from the briefs of Daniel Webster66 or the opinions of Joseph 
Story and other jurists. But do we not find reflections of these ancient 
understandings in the cases of our own time? Over the last twenty 
years, the courts have revived the thirteenth amendment and section 
1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.67 In cases like Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co. 68 and Runyon v. McCrary, 69 the federal statute was used 
successfully to reach discrimination against blacks in private housing 
and private schools. The decisive part of the statute, for these cases, 
was the provision that all persons shall have "the same right . . . to 
make and enforce contracts. " 70 As the argument has run in these 
cases, the refusal of private establishments to deal with blacks as cus-
tomers or patrons marked a refusal to regard blacks as parties with the 
dignity - with the competence or the moral standing - to act as 
"contracting" parties. The men who framed the Civil War amend-
ments understood that the right to enter into contracts drew on the 
same moral premises that established the standing of black people as 
"free agents," with a claim to their natural and civil freedom. We 
have made use of these statutes in our own day, and they may yet help 
to remind us of the moral standing we recognize in beings who may 
properly claim the "freedom to contract." 
The writers of the casebook tum away from "freedom to con-
tract," as politically tainted; but they write, with a benign hopefulness, 
·about a domain of personal rights that fl.ow from the recognition of 
human "autonomy." But of course, we do not recognize claims of 
autonomy on the part of horses and cows, and no one would think of 
eliciting the "informed consent" of monkeys before they are subjected 
to surgery in a laboratory. The notion of "autonomy" arises only for 
moral agents; it finds its root in the same premises that underlay the 
"freedom to contract." Why is it "reactionary," then, to speak seri-
ously of the "freedom of contract," but somehow "progressive" or lib-
eral to extend the principle of "autonomy" and "informed consent"? 
To express reservations about "rent controls" may be taken as the 
mark of a mind notably indifferent to the advance of mankind. But 
when a court permits the relatives of a comatose patient to pull the 
plug on Uncle Julius - when it permits the relatives to act as agents 
for the "autonomy" or "privacy" of Uncle Julius in denying his own 
medical treatment - the judges are applauded for another advance in 
human liberation. 11 
66. One could hardly find a statement more learned in the law, or more philosophically 
compelling, than the brief written by Webster in Ogden v. Saunders. For the text, see 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) at 237-54. 
67. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1982). 
68. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
69. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
70. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1982). 
71. See, as an illustrative case here, in connecting "privacy," "autonomy," and the removal 
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This much may be said of the difference between the old apostles of 
"freedom of contract" and the new partisans of "autonomy": The 
judges who spoke seriously about the "freedom of contract" were alert 
to the moral ground from which that freedom arose. For that reason, 
they were alert to the fact that the freedom of contract could never 
encompass "the right to do a wrong" or to contract for immoral 
things. The same premises that established the rightful freedom of 
contract established an understanding, also, of the things that one 
could not claim in the name of one's "freedom to contract." 
But that same understanding does not seem to be present in the 
claims of "autonomy." The writers of the casebook evidently find the 
notion progressive and liberal. And yet, they do not even attempt to 
suggest the ground in which it is rooted: From what does it derive? 
What proposition, what axiom or truth, makes the claim to autonomy 
valid? What makes it "good" or "desirable"? Is it "good" merely 
because we stipulate it to be good, as a matter of our own, arbitrary 
insistence? Or do we stipulate it as good because there is something 
that makes it in principle good? These questions all had compelling 
answers when the claim to freedom was rooted in the nature of beings 
who had access, through their reason, to the standards of moral judg-
ment. The answers could be made irresistible when it was shown that 
these same beings would fall into a hopeless contradiction when they 
resorted, as Kant said, to that perverse maneuver of "[proving] by rea-
son that there is no reason. "72 
But the writers of the casebook treat this ground of their jurispru-
dence as one of the enduring mysteries of the text. The closest they 
come to intimating a response to the problem comes in a discussion of 
Justice Douglas and the new jurisprudence of "privacy" and "funda-
mental rights." They recall a book in which Douglas set forth the 
"theological underpinnings" of this jurisprudence. Douglas had writ-
ten that, "[i]n our scheme of things, the rights of men are unalienable. 
They come from the Creator, not from a president, a legislator, or a 
court" (pp. l, 82). This, the writers are willing to regard as a "theo-
logical underpinning." But the writers also seem to share the convic-
tion, widely diffused in this country, that views on theology are 
matters of private belief, which may not rightly be imposed on anyone 
else with the force of law. If the new jurisprudence of privacy and 
fundamental rights really finds its ground in "theological" beliefs, 
could those rights be available even to people who do not share these 
beliefs? Would Justice Douglas be warranted in shaping the law of the 
of medical treatment, In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1984). New Jersey 
courts have led this movement, and one could hardly cite a decision that is more "advanced" on 
this scale than In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
72. I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 97 (1788) (6th ed. 1927). See also H. 
ARKES, supra note 9, at ch. IV. 
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Constitution according to the maxims of his "religious beliefs"? Some 
of Justice Douglas's liberal allies have been strenuous in their efforts to 
remove, from our political life, any trace of religiosity. The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has even suggested that laws restricting 
the funding of abortion are founded on religious belief, and on that 
basis it has sought to have these laws struck down as unconstitutional. 
But Justice Douglas was one of the chief supporters of the kind of 
argument made by the ACLU in support of the right to an abortion.73 
Are we to understand now that his jurisprudence of privacy and fun-
damental rights was in turn traceable to nothing other than his own 
religious beliefs? Would the ACLU be inclined, then, to regard Doug-
las's jurisprudence as unconstitutional? 
Or might the claims to privacy and fundamental rights rest on 
other grounds, accessible to people of all religious beliefs? The writers 
of the casebook do not say. They suggest that these notions of "pri-
vacy and personal liberty" are "based in visions of the polity's tran-
scendent structure and underlying political theories as in the text of 
the constitutional document" (p. 935). But they do not take the occa-
sion, in these 1,200 pages, to explain the theories they have in mind -
or to indicate just which one of those theories offers the most satisfying 
ground for the support of these rights. In the meantime, their use of 
the plural is suggestive: The reference to "theories" may imply that, 
in the judgment of the writers, no single theory so far has been persua-
sive. In that event, they suggest that we are faced here with a host of 
theories with varying degrees of implausibility: We have a jurispru-
dence that commands the reverence of the writers but not their reason. 
It becomes decorous, then, to ask: Might the case for "autonomy" 
and personal rights have been illuminated if the compilers had brought 
into the casebook a larger sampling of the classic writings, by the law-
yers and judges who wrote with elegance and precision in explaining 
the ground of our constitutional freedoms in "natural rights?" Why 
not include the text of Marshall's opinion, or Webster's brief, in Ogden 
v. Saunders? Why not Gibbons v. Ogden, or Worcester v. Georgia? 
None of these classic cases finds a place in the casebook, even in abbre-
viated form. Again, this is not to quibble over favorite cases, but to 
raise this question: By omitting these cases, have the writers made 
way for more illuminating, recent cases, which help to explain far 
more clearly the rights of "autonomy" and "privacy?" My own esti-
mate should be evident. It surely could not hurt a casebook on our 
current law to incorporate the best writing that this country has pro-
duced on jurisprudence; and it may offer the only possibility for sup-
plying the coherence that is missing in our current jurisprudence. 
But to pick up the thread from my beginning, here is where this 
casebook may "swerve" from our expectations. I confess that I nes-
73. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78-79 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). 
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tied in with this casebook during the Christmas holidays, and found 
the charm of meeting again so many old acquaintances - so many 
judges and venerable cases - to be savored yet again. The charm of a 
casebook is that it puts before us again the parade of our law - the 
cases and the characters, and the sensibilities of our writers - and 
gives them to us in smaller, manageable chunks. That is the seduction 
of a casebook. We sample the mind of Justice Story, without wading 
through his dissenting opinion of sixty pages in the Charles River 
Bridge case.74 But that is also where we finally feel the jolt: Story's 
careful argument, with its reaffirmation of natural rights, is reduced to 
one page (p. 964). Story had no special gift for compression, but that 
reduction to a single page does not even begin to offer a caricature of 
his argument. 
The jolt comes in realizing just how much reduction has taken 
place, along with the elegant pieces that have been omitted altogether. 
And that recognition prompts us to look more closely to see what has 
been omitted in the other cases. I have already referred to excisions in 
other cases, as they raised questions about the intentions of the editors. 
I offer these instances, in closing, for a different purpose: to bring out 
some final, melancholy points about the problems that may affect even 
the best casebooks (and I count the book I have in hand as one of the 
best). I will settle for two examples. 
* * * 
The editors reprint Justice Harlan's celebrated, and highly quota-
ble, dissent in the legendary case of Plessy v. Ferguson. 75 "[I]n view of 
the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no supe-
rior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens."76 But the editors neglect to reproduce another, tell-
ing section in Harlan's opinion - the section in which he remarks that 
"[t]here is a race so different from our own that we do not permit 
those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States. Persons 
belonging to it are, with few exceptions, absolutely excluded from our 
country. I allude to the Chinese."77 Harlan was willing to play, then, 
on the irony that, under the statute in Louisiana, "a Chinaman can 
ride in the same passenger coach with white citizens,"78 while black 
citizens could be declared criminals if they sought to ride in a public 
coach occupied by whites. 
Harlan's comments on the Chinese cannot be dismissed as a quirk 
confined to this case. He was willing, in other cases, to join the major-
74. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
75. 163 U.S. 537, 539 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
76. 163 U.S. at 559. 
77. 163 U.S. at 561. 
78. 163 U.S. at 561. 
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ity of the Court in cases that dealt illiberally with Chinese aliens. 79 
But this strand of his understanding bears a critical relevance to the 
ground of his dissenting opinion. Apparently, for Harlan, it was legiti-
mate to preserve superior and inferior ranks of persons in the country 
by denying certain classes of people access to citizenship. And in 
Harlan's understanding, these discriminations could be made tenably 
on the basis of race. But if it were legitimate to make discriminations 
based on race in assigning or withholding the rights of citizenship, 
why would it not be equally defensible to use race as a basis for other 
discriminations, among citizens as well? 
The inclusion of this passage on the Chinese would bring us to a 
recognition that has mainly been obscured over the years: For all of 
the celebration we have accorded Harlan, he never came to an under-
standing of the principle that made racial segregation wrong. That is 
why his opinion never offered a teaching that could be used, in later 
years, to replace the doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson. When the Court 
overruled Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education, 80 the question was 
often raised as to why the Court did not simply take Harlan's dissent 
in Plessy and paste it in as the opinion of the majority. But when we 
include the passage on the Chinese, we become alert to what was 
wanting, at the root, in Harlan's opinion. It becomes plainer then as 
to why that opinion could not explain a new doctrine for the Court on 
race and the law. 81 
* * * 
In the Pentagon Papers case, 82 almost none of the justices thought 
that there was a categorical right on the part of the press to be free 
from "prior restraint." With the exception of Justice Black (and possi-
bly Justice Douglas), they were all willing to concede that a newspaper 
might be restrained in advance, under certain circumstances, if that 
was a plausible way of averting a substantial harm. They agreed with 
the opinion, once expressed by Chief Justice Hughes, that a newspaper 
might be restrained from printing news about the movement of ships 
and troops in wartime.83 But of course, there was a war on in 1971, 
and American forces could be endangered by the publication of mate-
rial contained in the Pentagon Papers. The judgment had to hinge 
then on a gauging of the facts: Just what material, contained in what 
sections of the Papers, was likely to expose particular agents in the 
field or reveal something of practical importance to our adversaries? 
The case turned, then, on a reading of the facts. And where were 
79. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
81. This question is taken up more fully in H. ARKES, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY 43-
55, 227-46 (1981). See also H. ARKES, supra note 9, at 85-99. 
82. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
83. 403 U.S. at 713 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)). 
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the facts? Where were the Papers that would have to be examined? 
As Justice White noted, "the material remains sealed in court records 
and it is properly not discussed in today's opinions. "84 Why was it 
properly not discussed? Because, as White said, "the material poses 
substantial dangers to national interests," and for that reason, he sug-
gested, "a responsible press may choose never to publish the more sen-
sitive materials."85 The material was so freighted with danger that it 
was prudent to avoid the revelations that could arise in Court - and 
yet White was willing to permit the New York Times, a private corpo-
ration, to balance the danger to the national interest against its own, 
private interests in publishing. 
But the matter ran even deeper, to the very rationale of the Court 
in the case. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out, with a fusion of dis-
belief and outrage, "We do not know the facts of the cases. No Dis-
trict Judge knew all the facts. No Court of Appeals judge knew all the 
facts. No member of the Court knows all the facts. . . . [W]e literally 
do not know what we are acting on."86 And yet the Court decided. 
The editors chose to omit these observations, made by White and 
Burger, even though they report facts that were critical to the han-
dling of the case (pp. 576-84). These remarks of the justices may seem 
to be niggling complaints, offered in passing, but they become critical 
- even decisive - if one is trying to clarify the structure of the 
Court's argument. Consider it again: The Court holds that there is no 
categorical right to be protected from restraints applied in advance. 
Whether a restraint is legitimate depends on whether it can be justified 
in the particular case. Whether the restraint can be justified in this 
particular case would depend, then, on a careful reading of the facts. 
As it turns out, no court that passed on the case ever had access to 
those facts. And yet, the Court presumes to decide anyway; without 
seeing the Papers, it comes to the judgment that their publication 
poses no substantial danger, which would warrant a delay in 
publication. 
To reprint the remarks of White and Burger is not merely to publi-
cize a point of etiquette, but to reveal the descent of the Court into an 
incoherence touched with arrogance. By the admission of the justices, 
they did not have in hand the record that a court would need in ren-
dering a judgment. And even if they had that record, the justices 
could not have estimated the dangers lurking in the Papers without 
the guidance of people in the executive branch, in the agencies on in-
telligence. If the Court understood that it was not in a position to 
render a competent judgment in the case, why could it not have fol-
lowed the advice of Justice Harlan and done the constitutionally deco-
84. 403 U.S. at 732-33. 
85. 403 U.S. at 733. 
86. 403 U.S. at 748, 751 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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rous thing? Why could it not have deferred to another branch of the 
government, which could claim the constitutional standing, and the 
competence, to reach a judgment?87 Why was the Court moved, in-
stead, to grasp the decision for itself, deny the constitutional claims of 
the executive branch - and then abandon the responsibility of judg-
ment to a private corporation? 
* * * 
My point here is that these questions are more likely to spring 
from the case when the remarks offered by White and Burger have not 
been filtered from the text. As we know, this filtering is the cost we 
come to accept for the convenience of a casebook. But we ought to be 
clear that the most fetching appeal of a casebook runs well beyond 
these claims of convenience. Teaching, at its best, can be a form of 
seduction, and an appealing casebook may help to seduce. For the 
student who is encountering the subject of law for the first time, the 
casebook may offer samples of the most elegant writing, directed to 
questions of consequence. It may offer a series of snapshots of the 
most arresting characters, and the most attractive sensibilities, that 
have filled the stage of jurisprudence. But the interest of the student 
may be suffocated if he is immersed, too soon, in the full intricacies of 
a long, learned opinion. A sensitive teacher will not wish to saddle his 
beginning student with all sixty-six pages of Story's dissent in the 
Charles River Bridge case. He will wish to give the student just 
enough to suggest the reach of the opinion, but without inducing a 
boredom that might become terminal. 
That is what must be said, earnestly, on behalf of a casebook. On 
the other hand, some of the most engaging moments in the classroom 
arise when a student has discovered a passage in the text that runs 
counter to the argument offered by the professor, or to the common 
wisdom that has settled over a case. The student is more likely to 
discover that passage if it has not been edited out by a professor who 
no longer regards it as apt or momentous. Our first reflex, in judging a 
book, is to consider the omissions, as I have here. But how can we 
judge a book in this way unless our own understanding has been 
formed by the reading - and rereading - of these cases in the origi-
nal documents and the complete texts? That is how even the slowest 
among us come to discover the passages that may be neglected by 
other commentators. Our abiding concern, then, about casebooks 
may not be for the nourishment they supply to the students, but for 
the way they guide the professors who use them. What shall we say of 
87. As Justice Harlan observed, 
I can see no indication in the opinions of either the District Court or the Court of Appeals in 
the Post litigation that the conclusions of the Executive were given even the deference owing 
to an administrative agency, much less that owing to a co·equal branch of the Government 
operating within the field of its constitutional prerogative. 
403 U.S. at 758 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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the teacher oflaw who becomes habituated to a regimen of casebooks, 
and what he knows of the cases, he knows mainly through the excerpts 
that he has had, for years, near at hand? 
And yet, certain vices may beget their own correctives. 
Casebooks, at their best, help to seduce, and that seduction may pro-
duce a benign reaction. It may produce a state of affairs in which 
distinction is drawn instantly to the character who is moved to read, 
with uncommon awareness, the original texts. I sense that the writers 
of this casebook are alert to this hidden incitement contained in their 
project, and that awareness may provide one of their secret satisfac-
tions. They understand that the casebooks may do what professors, 
with their mere passion for the cases, may be incapable of doing: The 
regimen of casebooks may make the reading of the original texts into 
an illicit experience. 
